The Efficacy of Davānī’s Philosophical Thought on Mullāšadrā’s Opinions on the Issues of Principality, Making and Causation Based on The Theory of Tasting of Theosophy

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Abstract

In three issues there is a feasibility to make a relatedness between Allamah Davānī and Mullā Şadrā: principality of existence, making and causation. It may be possible to trace Davānī’s thought in Mullā Şadrā’s philosophy from the existence as a single-substaining matter to the gradation of being, from the absolute being (wujūd-i mušaq) to the concept of existence, from the existing quiddity being made to the making of the reality of being, and from the inhering existence to the connective being on the issue of causation.

Keywords: existence, making, causation, inhering existence, connective being.

1. Davānī and the theory of principality

Finding Jalâl ad-Dîn Davānī’s opinion on the external distinction between the existence and quiddity is one of the important discussions. Because it is a central issue concerning principality of existence, quiddity and the divisions of the existence.

1.1 Davānī and two peripatetic and illuminationist schools

The issue of principality of existence and the quiddity is minor apropos of the issue of the distinction between the existence and quiddity. It should be noted that principality of existence for the first was raised by Mullā Şadrā after Davānī’s era in a philosophical issue in the sphere of thought of philosophy.

Davānī who has emerged after the period of two peripatetic and illuminationist schools maintains that the external occurrence invalidates the existence related to quiddity and believes the absolute-abstract being can only be extracted out of existing quiddities without external occurrence taken place and this absolute being is a formal concept and the existing quiddities are nothing but an quiddity that ascribed to the existent by necessity (wajbāl-wujūd) and is of no share of existence and the existence is only ascertained in the existent by necessity. As a result, it may be said that Davānī does not accept the distinction that the peripatetic school has maintained between the quiddity and the existence; therefore, he raises the discussion of mental and external occurrence and otherness (ziyāda) of the existence and quiddity and believes that not external distinction is there between these two.

1.2 Davānī and the existence and its kinds

Concerning the existence and its kinds, Davānī is of his own category based on specific attitude of his own. He believes in three matters: 1. existence 2. existent 3 intelligible of existence. Davānī maintains that the existence is a single-substaining matter and an external truth which is the origin of derivation of existents.

Davānī maintains that “the existent” is more general of the very external-single-subsisting truth as well as matters imputed to that external-subsisting-single truth. The other interpretation of Davānī of the existent is the particular being which consists of existent by necessity and possible existent (mumkinal-wujūd). He believes the particular being of existent by necessity is the particular truth which is not analyzable into the existence and object in the mind. Along with accepting the existence and existent, he maintains another matter called “the intelligible of existence” and in his other interpretation “the absolute being” that is adapted to the concept of existence of Mullā Şadrā. Some people think that Davānī believes in the absolute being more common than necessity and contingens, and indeed, in his point of view, the absolute being equals the existent, whereas such a thing is not true at all. Davānī announces frankly that there is no
The issue of making was raised by Shaikh al-Ɨ'r, and maintains that there is an external reality in particular being.

1.3 Șadr-ul-Muṭ'aliḥīnShīrāzī, the principality of existence and its subfolders and criticizing Davānī

MullāŠadrā is the creator of the theory of the principality of existence as a philosophical issue. Principality means having an external reality and extension in the extra-mental world while consideration is against it. In MullāŠadrā's point of view, the reality of existence is coextensive with being, and in quiddity there is only confinement, and it is a non-existential matter that its representation is just possible in the mind. Davānī maintains that the principality is in the existent by necessity or the existence, however, in possibilities, what makes them realizing is mere attributing of their quiddity to the existent by necessity. Șadr-ul-Muṭ'aliḥīnShīrāzī who maintains that the principality is with existence and the realizing factor is the existence does not accept MullāŠadrā's theory.

MullāŠadrā believes the existence comprises of the existent by necessity and possible existent contrary to Davānī who believes the existence limited in the existent by necessity. At that, in MullāŠadrā’s philosophy, the existence and existent are one and the same, while in Davānī's thought, as stated in anticipation, the existence equals the existent by necessity and the existent comprises the existent by necessity and possible existent. In Davānī's view, the intelligible of existence is a mental and mentally-posted matter. Whereas MullāŠadrā’s philosophy also considers the concept of existence a mental and mentally-posted matter. Both philosophers are similar in believing that the concept of existence is related, but from the point of the author of the article it is impossible to consider Șadr-ul-Muṭ'aliḥīnShīrāzī's affected by Jalāl ad-Dīn Davānī in this connection, because Davānī's frame in believing that the concept of existence is related is due to lack of authenticities in possibilities and making a common matter related out of different matters, whereas, MullāŠadrā’s frame in maintaining that the concept of existence is related is due to the external reality of the existence and disability of crossing in the mind, hence, the mind makes a concept out of it and trusts, the very thing that later was called the philosophical-secondary intelligible.

Some of MullāŠadrā's reasons for the principality of existence in all degrees of existence and impressions of the principality of existence from his point of view are following checked:

1.4 Some of MullāŠadrā’s reasons on the principality of existence

1. It necessitates for the thing caused to have a cognition with the cause. On the other hand it has been proven that the existent by necessity is similar to the existence and with no boundary. Hence, what is issued is the existence of objects not their universal quiddity, for there is no compatibility and similarity between the existent by necessity and the quiddity of possibilities.

2. If the existence is related and the quiddity is original, it will necessitate that infinite specific quiddity distinct from one another in an actual way occurs in the finite move in quantity and quality which is an impossible matter, moreover, it necessitates that the move in quantity and quality becomes a set of corpora indivisible which is a null matter.

3. How would it be possible that the existence is related? Whereas it is an essential making. If it is possible to accept the making of existence, the principality will be with the existence owing to the attachment of the making to the existence.

1.5 Some results based on the principality of existence

1. The connective being of the thing caused
2. The qualification of quiddity to the existence
3. Only is the existence fulfilled in the external world
4. Theology
5. Gradation in the existence
6. Science

2. Illuminationists and the issue of making

The issue of making was raised by Suhrawardī for the first time; however, it was not raised as a separate discussion. Shaikh al-‘Israaq maintains that the effect of the Maker is primarily and essentially quiddity, furthermore, it is this very quiddity being made that would require the quiddity to be existed and its qualification to the existence without the Maker
false the existence and/or the qualification of quiddity to the existence again, because the existence and the qualification of quiddity to the existence are mentally-posted and intellectual matters and its instances are the very quiddity derived of it.

2.1 Peripatetic philosophers and the issue of making

Ṣadr-ul-Mutʿallihīn reasons that the thing caused must be similar to the cause, and inasmuch as the existent by necessity is like the existence, which diffuses out is existences of objects not their quiddity, because the existence of objects is similar to the essence of agent and Maker, he cites Avicenna’s speech in Risalat al-Ishq (Essay on Love) to emphasize the cognition between Maker and something made. He attributes causation and effect in various aspects of existences to Peripatetic philosophers and adduces witness Avicenna’s saying in al-Ilahiyyat (Theology) al-Shīfā purport that serving as the cause of existence. Khawāja Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī also emphasizes that the existence is something made.

2.2 Davānī and something essentially made

Davānī believes in two kinds of making: the originated and invented one. The originated making is “an object being made” which is a non-composite making and without any plurality which is idiomatically called what is meant by “be” as a perfect verb and/or the signification of simple whether-ness. However, the invented making is “an object being made to something” which is the composite making and needs something made and the governed thing in the making state like the effusion of form over the substance which is idiomatically what is meant by “be” as an imperfect verb and/or the signification of composite whether-nesses. Davānī considers the something essentially made as the quiddity of existent and even believes predecessors have followed this very view in the discussion of something made. The important thing is that even Davānī denies the theory qualification being made as well, the theory ascribed to the latter of Peripatetics. Davānī reasons that if he wants the qualification to be something made, there are other qualifications again between this qualification and the existence and also this qualification and the quiddity and to the finite that all of which must be something made which leads to non-realization due to infiniteness, therefore, qualification may not form the base of the effusion of form over the substance which is idiomatically what is meant by “be” as an imperfect verb and/or the signification of composite whether-nesses.

2.3 Mullā Ṣadrā and the issue of making

Based on Ṣadr-ul-Mutʿallihīn Shīrāzī’s thought, it is conspicuous as per the principalities of existence and the quiddity being mentally-posted that something essentially made is the existence to the non-composite making and the meaning of existence is also the very reality of existence. Because, on the one hand, the cause-caused relationship, i.e., making-existential relationship, is a relationship between external realities so that an external reality creates the other external reality and the second reality is its action, impression and something made; and, on the other hand, external realities are not the type of quiddity according to the principalities of existence and the quiddity being mentally-posted but are non-quiddity matters. As a result, something essentially made and the effect of the Maker is the reality of existence as the essential Maker is the reality of existence, namely an ontological truth is the impression and action of another ontological truth.

In other argument, Mullā Ṣadrā rejects the quiddity being something made and especially Davānī’s idea and says: if quiddity requires the Maker according to its own entity, in this case, it will be in need of the Maker within its own entity, moreover, the Maker will be authoritative in the subsistence of its entity, so that it will be impossible to imagine it without the Maker, whereas it is not so, because it is possible to imagine many quiddities with their definitions, although, there is doubt in their realization and acquisition let alone to be aware of acquisition of their Makers, for quiddity does not point to a thing other than itself.

2.4 Davānī and the difference between connective being and inhering existence and the review of Mullā Ṣadrā

Mullā Ṣadrā becomes finally and at the end of the discussion of the connective being and independent existence the believer that the only independent existent is God and other than Him everyone is the connective being.

Why Mullā Ṣadrā is different in his view with ancestors, he maintains that they consider the existence of possibilities as an existence inconsistent with the existence of existent by necessity and, nonetheless, they believe the existence of possibilities is somehow related to the existence of existent by necessity and maintain that this relation and ascription
necessitates the contingent being. Whereas, from the point of Śadr-ul-Mut'ālihīn Shīrāzī, the possibility is imputed to the existent by necessity per se and not a redundant relation on its entity and it is mortal in the existent by necessity in its entity. Mullā Ṣadrā considers all things as similar to the connection to God.

2.5 Davānī and the issue of causation

A) Davānī and the inhering existence of the thing caused

According to Davānī's point, it is not that the thing caused need two Makers in quiddity and its existence, but making belongs to the quiddity, and the existence is abstracted from the quiddity.

Another thing that proves the theory of connective being of the thing caused in Davānī's thought is the note and similitude that he mentions. As he says under the note that: "the thing caused related is not pure, and it is considered in terms of its relation with the cause, it is of realization; furthermore, if it is considered as an independent entity off the cause, it will be non-existent and rather impossible." Davānī likens the relation between the cause and the thing caused to the relation between accident and essence and says that if melanaemia is considered independence from the object, its existence will be impossible, however, if it is considered accidental for the object, it will be the existent.

2.6 The review of Mullā Ṣadrān Davānī's opinion

Referring to the topic that Peripatetic philosophers believe the existence of the thing caused is something made, while illumination scholars maintain that the quiddity of the thing caused is something made, in criticizing the second group that according to his interpretation Davānī and his pupils have considered it as the illumination scholars' view, Śadr-ul-Mut'ālihīn says: the second group has thought that if something made is the existence of the thing caused, it will necessitate the Maker ascertain the existence of quiddity and give away essential parts to Him by the composite making, whereas it is no so, because there is a difference between the need by-itself and the need by accident, and the truth of essential parts upon the thing do not need any making of the Maker, but making of essential parts depends on the entity, then, the making of entity and essential parts is done by a single making not the composite one. Thus, the different point of view between Davānī and Mullā Ṣadrā in the issue of making is that one believes that the existence of the thing caused is something made and the other maintains that the quiddity of the thing caused is so, nevertheless, there are consensus of opinions in this meaning that making of essential parts is not by the composite making but by the non-composite one, that is, the very existence or quiddity that the agent makes is of that essential parts in itself.

Mullā Ṣadrā believes two meanings of the connective being and the inhering existence have not been differentiated in Davānī's speech, for in that the object is black, there is no black in that it has been predicated given in answer to a composite whether-ness except in the sense that it is of a positiveness for the object and there is no hindrance that black has been of an existence in the composite whether-ness by the consideration of the other apart from the consideration of quality given, although, its existence in-itself is the very existence for the object.

As such, Mullā Ṣadrā in this criticism does not consider the accident right in Davānī's thought on the inhering existence, but his criticism focused on the relation between the cause and the thing caused that its similitude to the relation between the accident and the person afflicted with accident requires the dictum to the connective inhering existence of the thing caused, inasmuch as the existence of the thing caused is the connective being from Mullā Ṣadrā's point of view.

B) Davānī and the connective being of the thing caused

There are statements that show Davānī believes the thing caused is an aspect of aspects and the states of cause. In his view, causal ends up in a unique existent that the overall series are directly and/or indirectly thing caused. It is a real entity and the whole series are its states, modes and aspects. Then, what is in the world is not diverse entities but a unique entity that is of multiple attributes. The chronological extension which is also the place of change, transformation and arena of global events along with events therein is a state of states of the first cause and encompasses all states of the next.

2.7 The review of Mullā Ṣadrā on Davānī's opinion and approval and affection

Davānī's simile has faced with problems from Mullā Ṣadrā's point of view, for line is not gradually mortal and acquired little by little unlike events, and there is its potential components as well. Davānī's point of view that the thing caused is an aspect of aspects and a manifestation of manifestations of the cause requires a dictum to the personal unity of the existence, hence, it causes the negation of multiplicities, the thought that has been brought up in the works of great
mystics such as Ibn `Arabī, Kāshānī, Qiyāṣarī, Jāmī, Sayyid Haydar Amuliānd Ibn Turk-ilsfahānī. Although MullāŞadrā at the beginning becomes the believer of graded unity in which by accepting the real existence of multiplicities he considers them as graded hierarchies of existence of the divine unity, in the end he becomes the believer of the theory of particular unity of existence. So it is possible to speak according to the relationship which is or at least in some part between MullāŞadrā’s view and Davānī’s in which causation is transformed into the issue of diversity and modality (tasha’ā’un), and it may say that both of them have closed to mystics’ view in this connection. Nonetheless, in any case, similar expressions in works of these two philosophers make the efficacy of Davānī on MullāŞadrā’s Shīrāzī probable. Some of his similar expressions are as follows:

Davānī says that if form is the concept, it will be different from the truth. MullāŞadrā also Neglects this part of al-zawrā in Asfār and does not mention anything about it, whereas this view is compatible with the theory of particular unity of the existence in which MullāŞadrā believes.

3. Causation in MullāŞadrā’s thought

The assumption of categorical relation between God and possibilities is now out the question according to MullāŞadrā in Asfār, because the categorical relation is one of the highest genera, insomuch as the necessary existence is the mere existence and is not under the topic of relation.

He believes the relation of the existent by necessity with the world is not like the relation of the construction with the building or the relation of the writer with the writing, for both of them are the thing caused after the authorship of the agent and independent and self-sufficient of the agent.

Şadr-ul-Muṭ‘allihīn says on the authorship of God: God’s authorship is the authorship by nature according as a group of Ṭabā‘īyāh and Dahşīyūn, and it is the authorship by intention based on the majority of theologians. In this place, he accepts the existence of multiplicities as an evident matter and calls its denier a casuist, yet he becomes the believer of the particular unity of the existence at the end of the discussion of causation in Asfār and is at one with mystics, besides, he introduces possibilities as the states, aspects and modes of the necessary existence. Definitely, these two views are contradictions regarding to some contemporaries.

Şadr-ul-Muṭ‘allihīn says that all creatures such as the intellect, soul and form of the species are stages of rays of the true light and manifestations of God’s subsistent existence. God bestowed me the demonstration of this meaning in accordance with His eternal grace. This principle is an exact, complex and difficult-detectable one.

In the theory of connective being, MullāŞadrā maintains that the existence of possibilities is the same as the connection with the necessity and their need and poverty is one with the principle of their reality. Therefore, according as him, what is the yardstick of the need of the thing caused to the cause is this very poverty and need that is in the truth of connection with the necessity and their need and poverty is one with the principle of their reality. Therefore, according as him, what is the yardstick of the need of the thing caused to the cause is this very poverty and need that is in the truth of an object which interprets it as the poverty possibility or existential poverty.

4. The summation of the impact of Davānī’s reflection on Mullā Şadrā on the issue of causation

Davānī has become afflicted with confusion between inhering existence and connective being in Resālatal-zawrā on the existence of the thing caused, so that there are two indications to confirm the first one and two other ones for the second one in the treatise. What confirms the statement of inhering existence is; one, his belief in quiddity being made which is compatible with principality of quiddity and the other is to liken the relation between cause and effect to the relation between quiddity and non-essential quality and both of which are incident to the majority acceptance in the world. MullāŞadrā who maintains that the existence of the thing caused lies in the connective being criticizes Davānī’s idea in Asfār.

However, what confirms the connective being of the thing caused in Resālatal-zawrā is one; changing the issue of causation to the issue of diversity and modality (tasha’ā’un) and believing that the thing caused is a state of states and an aspect of aspects of the cause, and the other is Davānī’s idea on the relation between the truth and intuitive knowledge, namely he maintains that the truth is an extensive and unique matter and what makes its multiplicity is its appearance in different levels of perception, therefore, sensory, imaginal and intellectual ideas are nothing but manifestations and epiphanies of the truth. In Asfār, MullāŞadrā does not speak on this section of Resālatal-zawrā, perhaps because he does not see any controversy in it and accepts it, or because he maintains that it is incompatible with the principality of quiddity and believes that it is just enough to point merely at the occurrence of confusion between the connective being and inhering existence in Davānī’s saying. In the beginning, MullāŞadrā adopts the concept of analogy from Shaikh al-‘Iṣraq and maintains that it flows in the existence not in the quiddity and becomes a believer in the analogical gradation unity (vaḥdat-i tashkīkī) of existence and accepts being of multiplicities in the world as a conspicuous matter; although,
he approaches finally the theosophists' view and speaks on the personal unity of the existence. In this place, he negates independent existence of multiplicities and consider them as the divine light of manifestations. Davānī may be considered as the pioneer of Mullā Ṣadrā in assimilating philosophical thoughts and prescriptive-supreme themes in verses and traditions.

References