David Hume, Miracles and Irrationality

Merlina Koseni (Pograzha)

Abstract


Through this article I shall deal with the Hume’s idea that is always irrational to believe a story about a miracle happened. David Hume argues that it is not rational to believe the testimony of a miracle. He believes that this conclusion derives from the principle that a prior failure for a specified event occurs rejects the possibility that the witness of the event is telling the truth. In general terms, this means that the witness is always subject to induction. In that way, as the possibility that a miracle happens, is astronomical in its own definition, we should never believe that someone's story proves it. Many critics have dismissed the evidence that Hume gives us and they are based on probability, not to accept the evidence of these miracles without addressing them on a case by case basis. Despite these criticisms, my goal in this article is to try to see this as an evidence of his consistent so long as we keep in mind what are the definitions of Hume on miracles and natural law. Many of these critics are wrong because they do not take into account what Hume means by miracles and natural law and apply its test in inappropriate cases.

DOI: 10.5901/ajis.2013.v2n3p103


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Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies ISSN 2281 3993(Print) ISSN 2281-4612(Online)

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